What if most CEOs misunderstand their real job? It's a question the legendary management thinker Dr. W. Edwards Deming loved to ask. Too often, leaders make decisions that seem smart for one department, only to create bigger problems somewhere else in the organization.   In this episode, systems strategist Dr. Sheila Ronis shares what she learned working alongside Deming at Bell, Ford, and General Motors. She takes you inside the breakup of the Bell System, when the whole country still needed to hear a dial tone, and explains why leaders must understand the whole system, not just its individual parts.   If you've ever wondered why well-intentioned decisions sometimes make things worse, this conversation will give you a simple, practical way to look at your own organization.   🎧 Listen to discover what Deming believed a leader's real job should be, and why his thinking matters today.   TRANSCRIPT 0:00:03.0 Andrew Stotz: My name is Andrew Stotz. And I'll be your host, as we continue our journey into the teachings of Dr. W. Edwards Deming. Today, I'm here with featured guest, Dr. Sheila Ronis. And I am excited to hear about you and your journey. So are you ready to share your journey, Sheila?   0:00:23.5 Sheila Ronis: I certainly am.   0:00:25.1 Andrew Stotz: You've had quite a journey. I want to introduce you to the audience here. So I'm really delighted to welcome Dr. Sheila Ronis, President of The University Group Partners, a systems strategist, educator, and consultant who learned from, and worked with, Dr. W. Edwards Deming. She has applied systems thinking to business, government, national security, and strategic foresight, for more than five decades. And what you're gonna hear, as you listen to this story, is this journey that she's been through, from the Bell Systems, which is going back all the way… I think it was originally founded in 1870s, or something like that. And your journey from working at Bell Labs, and Bell System; to Ford, another giant; to GM, another giant; and then to the ultimate giant, the US government. So why don't you tell us a little bit about your journey?   0:01:26.2 Sheila Ronis: Okay. Well, I was really fortunate because I met Dr. Deming in 1979, when he gave lectures to every new Bell executive who was hired, and especially, young people who were in their high potential group. And I came to Bell, already having my doctorate, and a major assignment with Oak Ridge National Laboratory, before the Department of Energy even existed. And it was really wonderful, because it was very clear to me that the way he thought, was very similar to the way I thought. We were both educated as classical physicists. And so at the break, I went up to him and was just visiting, and saying how excited I was that he had his degrees in physics and mathematics, and that although, it was only my undergraduate degree in physics and mathematics. And he said, "Yes. But it says doctor on your tag." And I said, "Well, that's because my master's and doctorate, were in large complex social system behavior." And his eyes lit up, because he said, "Oh, my goodness." He said, "You and I need to talk more."   0:02:56.2 Sheila Ronis: And it began a dialogue and a discussion, that really didn't end until he passed away in 1993. And I was just so lucky to be able to work with him, first, in the Bell system, and during the Bell system reorganization, from 1982 to 1984. And then shortly thereafter, I worked with him at Ford Motor Company. And it was after that, that I worked with him, with Bob Dorn at General Motors. Bob Dorn then, was the chief engineer for the entire portfolio of General Motors vehicles. First, he was at Cadillac. And Cadillac won the Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award while he was there, because he took… Bob took Dr. Deming very seriously. And it was just a tremendous experience to work, both with Bob, and with Dr. Deming.   0:04:04.6 Sheila Ronis: In fact, Bob and I wrote a paper that Dr. Deming helped us write. And I think we presented it at one of the Deming Institute events. And that was in 1990, I believe. And anyway…   0:04:26.3 Andrew Stotz: I wonder if we can go back to that first meeting, when you first… Yeah. Let's just try to understand, was it 20 people in the room? Was it 500 people in the room? And what was your first impressions, as you started listening to this guy that you'd never heard of before?   0:04:45.9 Sheila Ronis: That's true. I didn't know who he was. But it was really interesting. There were only about 30 of us, because we were hired into management directly. And that was very unusual for the old Bell System. They hired people, first, to be in the line, usually. And you didn't get into management automatically. But people, like me, who already had higher education and advanced degrees, we were in a special category. But I was very interested in becoming a line executive, because I wanted that experience, to actually manage people, not just be in a staff position of some kind. And it was really amazing, because it was very clear from his discussions… Even though he talked a great deal about statistical process control, and the need for the use of statistics in the management of process… He, really, was conveying a management philosophy toward people. And that was obvious from the beginning.   0:06:14.6 Sheila Ronis: And I thought to myself, "My goodness. This is not just a technical person. This is a very intense individual, but with a depth of understanding in the truest, Verstehen, German sense." And of course, that Verstehen led to Profound Knowledge, and his ultimate System of Profound Knowledge. And it was his management philosophy that, in my view, at that time especially, put him heads… And just way above all the other people who I had been reading about, who were trying to technically control processes in manufacturing sectors, and things like that. And it just made him a completely different kind of person, and a completely different kind of consultant, and somebody who really understood the human dimension of an institution, and an organization.   0:07:30.1 Sheila Ronis: And without that, US industry was going nowhere. Because they didn't care about the human dimension. They thought that, what they called, soft issues, were of little value, and were not even important enough to invest in. And of course, they were dead wrong. Whereas, as Dr. Deming started to address the issues with the Japanese, he basically said, "It's the human dimension. You lead people, you manage process. And when something goes wrong, it's the system you have to look at, not the people. You give them the right tools, they will do fine, because they want to do a good job for you." And it was that philosophy that was very much conveyed in that very first day of that meeting, of that training.   0:08:36.3 Andrew Stotz: There was no ambiguity of what he was saying. You were… How old were you, roughly, at that time?   0:08:42.2 Sheila Ronis: 29.   0:08:43.8 Andrew Stotz: Okay. So '79, and…   0:08:47.2 Sheila Ronis: He was 50 years older than me.   0:08:48.8 Andrew Stotz: Yeah.   0:08:50.9 Sheila Ronis: And it was after he passed away, that I learned that he gave the famous 1950 lecture, literally, while I was being born on the same day. At about 8:30, it was an after-dinner speech, he made to all the industrialists of Japan, or 75% of them, or something. Well, at 8:30 in the morning, which was about the same time as he was speaking in Japan, I was born.   0:09:19.1 Andrew Stotz: Mm-hmm. A connection.   0:09:20.8 Sheila Ronis: I always knew I had a karmic relationship with this man.   0:09:23.7 Andrew Stotz: Yeah. And I was just thinking about, I was 24 in 1989, so 10 years later, when I first sat in front of him. And I got the same thing. And I was working on the factory floor at Pepsi, in manufacturing, and warehouse distribution. And I saw all the troubles. And it was clear, as a young guy with no experience, really, of managing anything, it was clear to me… Everything he said, was just so clear. And I think what you've expressed, is something that people that never have met him, or study with him, don't realize that he really is a humanist, and he believed in the potential of people, and he believed in the potential of intrinsic motivation. So that's a great, great way to start of the… Think about that. Day one, of your Deming journey, started with this incredible awakening. Or maybe, it's not even an awakening, because part of what he was trying to teach was that it's inherent in us. He was just letting it… "Hey, here's how we bring it out."   0:10:33.8 Sheila Ronis: And it was very contrary to a lot of the scientific management principles, that I think led a lot of people astray in many ways. Because they treated the human being as a cog in a wheel. And people are not cogs in wheels. They are agents. And the moment you put an agent into a system, first of all, it's nonlinear, it is complex, and you can't predict it. And management is supposed to be able to predict and control. And yeah, they can predict and control some things, like process, if they're in control. But people are a whole different story.   0:11:22.3 Andrew Stotz: Exactly. And okay. So let's go from 1979, to… Where is the next time that you have the next meaningful interaction? But before you go there, I just want to highlight one thing that you mentioned about when you went up to him to talk at the break. Here's a guy, 79 years old… And when I saw him, he was 89… And he just welcomed people coming up and talking. And that was his break time. For me, I'm like, "I need a rest."   0:11:47.6 Sheila Ronis: He was. He was so approachable. And I was so excited that he would talk to me. Who was I? This little girl from Cleveland, Ohio. And of course, it was later that I realized he was from Wyoming. So it was okay.   0:12:05.2 Andrew Stotz: Yep. Okay. So what was the next meaningful step in that journey?   0:12:08.8 Sheila Ronis: Okay. Well, the next meaningful, was still at Bell. And it was during the Bell System reorganization. And it was, really, just serendipity that I got a chance to work on the Bell System reorganization. I had a baby the end of October, a beautiful baby boy, who's now a father of two kids, and sending his daughter off to college. And oh my goodness, a lot has gone on since then, but… And I came back from… I had six weeks of maternity leave, which was a big deal in those days. That was not the norm. And with my vacation, and everything, I was able to stay home, until right after the first of the year. And I came back on a Monday after New Year's. And on Friday, they announced the divestiture of the Bell System.   0:13:11.8 Andrew Stotz: What year was that, roughly? What was that?   0:13:13.8 Sheila Ronis: I was… They were getting ready to promote me. But the billet, the position, wasn't ready for me for a few weeks, because the guy was retiring whose position I was pegged to take. So they put me in the president's office on a special assignment for a couple weeks, to figure out… Oh, they were working on several little projects inside Michigan Bell. And it was really funny, because I get there, and the president of the company says, "You don't have anything to do. You go over there and find out… Get on the plane tomorrow morning, and go to Basking Ridge, and represent us and find out what all this stuff is about, and what we gotta do." And of course, he knew a little bit. But I don't think he really understood just how transformational the divestiture of the Bell System, really, would become. And one of the reasons…   0:14:14.3 Andrew Stotz: What year… That was in, like, '80?   0:14:16.6 Sheila Ronis: '82. 1982. January of 1982.   0:14:20.5 Andrew Stotz: Yep. And for those people that don't know much about this, AT&T, obviously, as I've mentioned, goes back to about 1870s. And it had been through a lot of transitions over the years. But in '82, and then I think eventually it took effect in maybe about '84 or so, there was this breakup of the Bell System, into what they called, Baby Bells.   0:14:46.3 Sheila Ronis: Mm-hmm. And AT&T.   0:14:48.7 Andrew Stotz: Yep.   0:14:49.6 Sheila Ronis: But anyway. So, part of the problem was that… This was a very complex… It was a traditional complex task. From my perspective, as a complexity scientist, I mean, I was in seventh heaven. And I got a chance to work with Charlie Brown, who was the chairman of the board, and a lot of other people. It was really an exciting time to be part of that industry. But I really had an opportunity to work with Dr. Deming. Because Dr. Deming, because he had been involved with Western Electric and the Bell System, really since the 1930s, he had a lot of ideas about what we needed to do in terms of the processes, the systems, how to redefine them. And he also brought in Dr. Russell Ackoff, from MIT. And we learned from him as well, how to take a large complex system from one state, and create it so that it was totally functional, into another state. And I had an opportunity to, actually, practice a lot of the theory that I had learned in my doctoral program. And it was really fantastic.   0:16:22.8 Sheila Ronis: I mean, I had so much fun. It truly was a life-changing experience for me, to work on this project with lots and lots of other people. But I think what came out of it, was a functional telecommunications network for the United States. And I don't think the people of the country had any idea what a miracle it was, when on January 1st, 1985, at the divestiture… Or 1984… When you picked up the telephone, you had dial tone. Of course, today's kids don't know what a dial tone is. But it's just amazing. Not only was it a miracle, but it was a miracle that the systems all worked well at the end. And you had to make sure that every segment… It was like… Every segment had to have all of the functionality of the whole, before. So every technology had to be present everywhere. And it was really a tremendous experience, that's all I can say. And Dr. Deming played a huge role. So did Dr. Ackoff. They both. And they worked well together. And I was just learning and learning. And I was one of the youngest people on the team. So I mean, I got to do all kinds of stuff that people didn't want to do, or deal with.   0:18:14.0 Sheila Ronis: So that was, really, my opportunity to get to know Dr. Deming even more. But then, to really take those lessons later into the automotive industry, and then later into the national security community, and apply the same approach using Dr. Deming's System of Profound Knowledge… Which is what I really used as my lens, on top of systems, and on top of complexity… To understand what really were the right questions to ask.   0:18:56.2 Sheila Ronis: Starting with, "What is your job?" Because that was his favorite to ask CEOs. Almost none of whom, could really describe what their job really was. And it was just astonishing to… I mean, it was a little… Sometimes, it made people feel very uncomfortable, especially the CEO, who really couldn't describe, "Well, I go to meetings." "Well, what are you doing in those meetings?" It was…   0:19:29.0 Andrew Stotz: What was he getting at? What would you say, he was getting at, when he was asking that question?   0:19:33.4 Sheila Ronis: Well, he wanted a person to tell them what the aim of their institution was, and how the people and the processes were managed effectively, to accomplish the aim of the system. I mean, pretty basic stuff. But not necessarily. Because people really didn't know what he was driving at. But once he got into it, a lot of them, I think, also… Especially in the auto industry… Not in Japan, but in the United States, where so many of the people who were running the companies, were not engineers, they were finance people. Especially, at General Motors.   0:20:26.2 Sheila Ronis: And he had a lot more luck, and a lot more effectiveness, working with engineers. Which may be why with Don Petersen at Ford, he was able to do a lot more, because Don Petersen understood. Whereas, the senior finance guys at General Motors, were somewhat clueless. They thought he was a fad. And I think Bob Dorn tried very hard to express, in the most forceful way he could, that this was no fad. This was fundamental. This was how you did it. This is what was needed. But the finance people couldn't really get past their idiosyncrasies.   0:21:15.4 Andrew Stotz: And for those people that don't understand the history of General Motors, part of the finance background came when General Motors got in trouble, and DuPont stepped in and took a stake. And DuPont had been implementing a methodology developed by a guy named, Donaldson Brown, who was an engineer, but developed a pretty simple way of looking at the return on investment. And so, that became known in the world of finance, as the DuPont method. And so, that implementation… I just finished reading, 'My Years with General Motors,' by Alfred Sloan. And so I've been working on something for a finance class of mine that really tells the story of Donaldson Brown, in particular.   0:22:03.5 Andrew Stotz: So there was this incredible focus on finance. And really, it was birthed in the fact that when DuPont took a stake, the company was in financial trouble, and they had to really pull things together. And they were… Unlike Ford, which was a very narrow-focused, one production line, one methodology… General Motors was building something much more sprawling, of a lot of different companies coming in. So you can see that the history of a company lasts forever, in the way that they think, and all of that.   0:22:37.8 Sheila Ronis: Right. Well, the other thing that really, I think, did a disservice to General Motors, was the reorganization in the 1980s that McKinsey did. McKinsey, over the years, has built a huge global presence in consulting. But the moment it was announced, I said to myself, "My God. That reorganization is going to fail." Because they have not taken into account the processes, the real processes of the organization, and how things really are done. Not who reports to whom; but how things are really done. And sure enough, they disrupted the informal organization of General Motors that made it work, because they just didn't take into account what was going on on the factory floors, and in their own internal supply chains. And it just messed everything up. And frankly, General Motors never recovered.   0:23:46.4 Andrew Stotz: Yeah. Now, I'm gonna go to your journey in Ford and General Motors next. But before we do that, I think it's fascinating, the systems aspect of Dr. Deming's teaching. It's really appealing to a guy like me, and many other people, who have studied it. But we didn't study complex systems, like you. So can you just take a few minutes to describe what it is, what is this all about: systems thinking, complex systems. And what were you onto that was connecting with Dr. Deming? Maybe, help us understand more about that.   0:24:27.7 Sheila Ronis: Well, in 1990… In December of 1990, Dr. Deming, we… Bob Dorn and I had sent Dr. Deming the paper that we were working on with him, that was meant for the senior people at Cadillac, to get a better appreciation for where we needed to go. And the only time Dr. Deming ever made me cry, was when he sent me this letter. And it said, "I liked your paper about systems, open and closed. You have taught me much." And I thought, "Oh my God." So I'm sitting there opening the mail, and my husband comes in, and he says, "Why are you crying? What happened?" And I said, "Dr. Deming told me that I've taught him much. Can you believe that?"   0:25:26.8 Sheila Ronis: Anyhow. A little aside. But complex system behavior isn't linear, let me start with that.   0:25:40.8 Andrew Stotz: Okay.   0:25:42.3 Sheila Ronis: In a complex system, you may want to control behavior of people; and you can't. You can try and coax people into doing something, or influence people, but you can't really control a person's behavior. You can tell them what you expect of them, in terms of their behavior. But especially, in terms of their performance, you need to give very specific guidelines. And then you need to motivate people to want to do what you're telling them you need from them. And that requires the development of personal relationships. Well, when you treat a person like a cog in a wheel, it doesn't work. And so, when senior executives, especially in the 1930s, '40s, and '50s in the United States, would talk about how crappy something was, or how terrible, they would always blame the people. And of course, it had nothing to do with them. It had to do with their poor processes, or poor training. It had to do with a lack of management that was done correctly.   0:27:05.5 Sheila Ronis: And I think that if we really are honest with ourselves, the organizations we work for, and the bureaucracies we serve, expect executives to be able to predict and control. And they don't really think of the facts, that large, complex, social systems are complex systems. That means they have their own set of behavior, some of which include, almost, principles like: you cannot control the behavior of a complex system. And by the way, there's no such thing as a closed system, except theoretically in physics, in a physics laboratory. But you're not going to have it in a real-world setting. All boundaries are open. That means what goes on inside affects what goes on outside; and vice versa. So if you have an environment that this system is living in, and that external environment gets really, really acidic, or hostile, or whatever, for that system to survive, it's gotta be able to adapt. That means it has to either learn, it has to sense, it has to do all kinds of things. It's almost a biological model.   0:28:30.1 Sheila Ronis: And management theorists were not thinking that way, for most of my life. They're only now, beginning to come to the realization of what complex system behavior is about.   0:28:49.5 Andrew Stotz: I wonder if… I think, for most people, they just they don't really… They get this, but they don't get it sometimes. And if we go back in time, we can look at, for instance, the writings of Adam Smith, when he was talking about in, 'The Wealth of Nations,' about division of labor, and productivity gains. Then we had Frederick Taylor saying, "Not only do we divide it, but there's an optimal way to do every single part of this." And then along comes Ford, and really, puts into practice what Taylor's talking about to an extreme extent. And then you have Deming coming along, and starting to bring this idea about systems thinking. And I think that it's hard, because I think the human nature is to try to divide and conquer, reduce, "inch by inch, it's a cinch." How do we how do we break this down? And I think it's just… It just is hard to think about things in a system perspective.   0:29:51.7 Sheila Ronis: But you also have to… You also have to help people know what the principles of systems are. And that is that… A system is a set of interdependent elements, that, literally, are interdependent. They do interact with one another. They also interact with the environment. And the more you understand about all those relationships, the better it is. And frequently, the only way to solve the problems, if you're in the system, is to step out of the system and look at the whole. Because frequently, that's where you find your solutions. And that's just so… It's almost the exact opposite of how scientists are trained to… Well, not divide and conquer; but certainly…   0:30:46.7 Andrew Stotz: Narrow the focus.   0:30:47.4 Sheila Ronis: Analyze, as opposed to synthesize.   0:30:50.1 Andrew Stotz: Right. Okay. All right. That gives us some concepts about… Complex systems isn't linear. It's got its own set of behaviors. There's interdependent elements, and it's also interacting with the external environment. And as you've said, sometimes to get real awareness of what's going on, you gotta step out of the system. So that helps us to think about it. So let's talk about where you went next after Bell in your career.   0:31:17.6 Sheila Ronis: Okay. After Bell, I went to the University of Detroit, which was the small Jesuit school in downtown Detroit. And I became the assistant dean of the business school. And we opened up a consulting firm to work with the auto industry, which was in serious trouble in 1985. And the vice chairman of Ford Motor Company, sat on our board of trustees. And he said, "Did you… Your resume says you you worked with Dr. Deming." I said, "Yes, sir. I did work with Dr. Deming." And he said, "You know him?" And I said, "Yes. I know him well." And he said, "Oh, I want you to come, and and do some work with us. Because we're trying to work with him, but he's not easy to work with." And I said, "I would love to work with you."   0:32:13.9 Sheila Ronis: So we put together a training program for for Bud Marx, who was then running their their accessories division. They were making seats, and various components of Ford. And it was just fabulous. But I couldn't believe they… It was the end of a fiscal year, and they wanted this work done the following year, and they wanted to use up some of the budget from the year before. And they said, "If we give you this money now, can you run the program all next year?" And I thought, "Well, how much are they gonna give me?" They gave me, like, $150,000; which in 1985, that was a lot for a university. They literally gave me a check, and I came in and handed it to the controller at the university, who I thought was gonna faint. I said, "Well, enjoy my money. But I'm gonna need some of it all next year because we're gonna do a project for Ford Motor Company."   0:33:34.0 Sheila Ronis: And it was fabulous, because I got to actually put together a training program, in the real world, with people who were on the factory floor, all the way up to executives, to better understand what Dr. Deming was going to be teaching them. It helped, I think, Ford, in many ways. I think it helped to cement a lot of the success that Ford, ultimately, had with Dr. Deming. Because they had more success than General Motors ever had, other than Cadillac and GM Powertrain.   0:34:15.5 Andrew Stotz: And for that… I know you later worked with General Motors. But maybe, is there any particular story that you remember of Dr. Deming, with those in that initial period, when you were developing that training program and getting things ready? Or anything from that period?   0:34:33.9 Sheila Ronis: Well, he gave me a lot of ideas for things that he had done with Toyota, that had worked in Toyota City, that he recommended. And so, a lot of that got… And I worked with the engineering college at the University of Detroit. And so, we brought in specialists in manufacturing engineering, and electrical engineering, and design for manufacturability, design for disassembly. I mean, we really brought in a lot of talent, some of which were already on the faculty of the engineering school at the university. And I also included some marketing people from the business school, and a lot of the management faculty. But it was really cool, because I got a chance to really mix and match the knowledge that was needed to faculty members who were thrilled to try this, and to see it succeed. Of course, a lot of that was because of Bud Marx's leadership, as the head of that division at Ford. He is truly a visionary, and he believed in Dr. Deming's principles. And it was just wonderful. And I think it also gave me the courage… Of course, Dr. Deming put Bob Dorn and me together, because he knew Bob needed help. And he knew what I had just done at Ford.   0:36:29.5 Andrew Stotz: And Bob Dorn was at General Motors.   0:36:31.8 Sheila Ronis: Correct.   0:36:33.6 Andrew Stotz: So tell us a little bit about the transition, from working with Ford, to then General Motors.   0:36:39.3 Sheila Ronis: Well, Ford… I almost felt Ford didn't need me anymore, at least not for this project. There were other things, I thought, they needed to do. But they were more at a strategic level in other ways. And I, eventually, was able to come back to the company, in about 2000, to work with Jack Nasser on some of those issues. But I couldn't really work with both Ford and General Motors at the same time. You just can't do that. But when I… I started to work with Bob Dorn at Cadillac, because he was a Deming disciple. And he really was a believer. And he really understood what needed to be done. The problem was, he was stuck in this General Motors quagmire. And it felt like he… I think he felt like he was in a bowl of molasses, trying to move fast, and trying to morph and change.   0:37:48.0 Sheila Ronis: General Motors had a very strong culture; but it was dysfunctional. And it hadn't always been dysfunctional, but it also didn't have that… They used to call it, the GM mark of excellence. Well, I'm not sure… I don't know when that mark of excellence ever was a mark of excellence. Because when I started working with Cadillac, I started to drive, literally, every one of their models. And I would come back, and I, literally, would drive to Bob's house… Which was a stone's throw from my office… And I would park the car, and I'd say, "Come here. I want you to look at this." And I'd say, "Look how uneven that is. Don't you think the customer sees that?" I mean, it was everything from fit and finish, to drive trains. And actually, the very first thing that Cadillac actually hired me to do, was to fix a car that was being manufactured in Torino, Italy, by Pininfarina. And then flown on a special Lufthansa plane to Detroit, to be attached to the chassis. They had made all these strategic mistakes, from how they acquired the car, the purchasing… Everything was messed up with this vehicle. And eventually, we did fix the car. But I couldn't fix the business model. It was flawed from the beginning. But it also gave me a real serious, in-depth understanding, of why General Motors had so many problems.   0:39:46.8 Andrew Stotz: Yeah. And I want to highlight. The '80s were just brutal for US car companies. When I think about…   0:39:56.4 Sheila Ronis: They were.   0:39:57.4 Andrew Stotz: I bought a Datsun 210, in 1984. And I drove that thing for seven years without… And I bought it secondhand, and I drove for seven years without almost any repairs required. And I was like… And I remember at that time… And I still pretty believe this, that really, it was always the desire of the US government to save General Motors on many different occasions. But I oftentimes think that it could have been a much better company if it was broken up. But I didn't get a lot of fans on that, because during the '80s, the Japanese were coming in hard. We were losing seriously. But anyways, it's just in a period of time that was just so brutal for car companies. And they lost a lot, and then they reinvigorated over time. And, anyways…   0:40:54.8 Sheila Ronis: Well, and I think the other thing that's important to understand, is that General Motors' footprint on the US economy, was enormous. And when you really look at the US auto industry, especially today… Although it includes many foreign companies, in terms of their supply chain… But the footprint on the US economy, is still enormous. People don't quite understand how enormous it is. But I think it's also important to understand how interdependent it is with the industrial base of the world, and how interdependent it is within the United States. Because if you're a small tool and die shop in Warren, Michigan, and you have… 85% of your business is General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler; and 15% of your business, though, is in a lot of other areas, but many of those things are supporting the Tank-automotive and Armaments Command, and other defense-related things. Well, if General Motors comes in and wipes you out, well, guess what happens to the 15% that was supporting ten weapon systems.   0:42:21.9 Sheila Ronis:  So I mean, today, the same set of issues, is multiplied many, many, many times, because we now have a global integrated supply chain.   0:42:57.2 Andrew Stotz: And that… Maybe, that's a good way to segue from your work with Deming in automotive, to then you transitioned more to working with the US government, Department of Defense, and other stuff. Maybe you can talk about where your systems thinking work, and Dr. Deming's work, came together for that part of your career.   0:43:21.1 Sheila Ronis: Well, Dr. Deming passed away in 1993. But in 1996, I wrote a paper, called, 'National Security and the Theories of Dr. Deming.' And in it, I actually take the Deming community through the System of Profound Knowledge, and how it relates to what I was looking at, in terms of defining what national security needed to be. One of the surprising things to me in 1990, when I first started to work with the US government, was I knew that the United States had a National Security Strategy. What I didn't realize, really until the summer of 1990, was that the United States didn't have a national strategy. We didn't have an aim. The closest thing we had, was the Declaration of Independence, and the Bill of Rights, and our Constitution. And I thought, well, it's been a wonderful founding document, but it's not an aim for the 21st century, as we try to prepare to be a successful nation on a difficult planet, with lots of issues that are global in scope, and global in scale, but for which the world is not prepared.   0:44:54.4 Sheila Ronis: And I think that it was Dr. Deming's systems approaches, that really enabled me to think about the nation as a complex social system, that needed a system of profound knowledge to be more effectively maneuvered. Because you don't manage a nation, but you can lead it if you understand those filters, and those various lenses that I was using, both in terms of complexity, in terms of systems, and complex systems, and then in terms of the theory of Profound Knowledge, adding the theory of psychology, which of course affects every human being. And in a world of 8 billion people, we better not leave that dimension out. But an understanding of statistical behavior, and of course, an understanding of how do you know what you know? Which is more important today, in a world of artificial intelligence and deepfakes.   0:46:25.4 Andrew Stotz: Yeah. One of the questions I was thinking about, was about how should a business person, an educator, a politician, a bureaucrat, think about… Dr. Deming talked a lot about tampering. There's a system, and you try to interject your idea of how you're gonna improve it. And he has the funnel experiment that he does, which is a great way of understanding how tampering just really messes things up. But how should someone think… If you're dealing with a complex system… Which most people are… How should we think about… To what extent can we interject? I mean, obviously, to say, "Well, there's nothing I can do here." But I'm just curious, how do you think about interjecting into a system?   0:47:17.3 Sheila Ronis: You start by defining the system. You make sure you understand the whole first. Because tampering… Tampering, has the assumption that if you don't understand the systemic, the second, third, and fourth-order effects of something, the cascading effects of a decision… That's tampering, if you haven't thought it through. But if you understand the system, then you will have thought through how this step will affect that step, and then that step, and then the next step in the process, and so on. It's very important to begin by a definition of: what is the system that you're going to try and improve. What is the current behavior? If you have processes, you better know what those processes are, and have documented them. If they are measurable, measure them. If you don't think they're measurable, let's think about ways or methods of measurement. Because usually, most processes can be measured, one way or another. And try and impose something so that you can get a handle on it. Sometimes, you have to really start from scratch. But you have to define your system. And make sure you understand the boundaries, and what's inside that system, and what's outside that system, and how is the handoff between systems.   0:48:54.7 Andrew Stotz: How do you help people with this concept, that every time that I look at systems thinking, I'm always faced with… It can be… It can quickly become overwhelming. Because we say, "Okay. I'm looking at the process," and I realize, "Ah, there's 47 processes right here. What do I do?" And then this system interacts with that system. Is this a subsystem? Is that another system? Should the system be… Should I be looking at it? It just can be overwhelming. How do you help people get through that?   0:49:22.9 Sheila Ronis: I have them document it all. And a lot of people say, "Well, oh my God, that's gonna take me forever." Yes, it may take you a while. But what you will learn in that process, is how things are really dependent on other things. Because that is… And it's the learning that matters.   0:49:44.9 Andrew Stotz: Yep.   0:49:47.5 Sheila Ronis: And I mean, I've done this so much now at the Pentagon, and in the National Security Council level, it's… But it's amazing how once you understand the complexity, even though you may not understand it enough to write an equation that will predict everything… Like my friend Yaneer Bar-Yam at MIT. My God, he's really done this stuff, and he can really reduce a lot of system behavior to mathematical principles. But when you get into the human dimension element, you really have to better understand. And that just takes studying, and looking, and observing, and it takes hard work. But it also takes attention to documentation of what's really going on here, and what's really going on there. And an understanding of second, third, and fourth-order effects, and cascading unintended consequences that could occur. It's the reason I got into strategic foresight, because I started to do scenarios. Well, if this happens, then you can see how the behavior… This decision is going to affect that. And it's that kind of thinking that you need to do.   0:51:22.0 Andrew Stotz: Yeah. That helps. The second-order effects, or, you know… It's just… It's incredible. It can be overwhelming. But I think there's two things I'm thinking about. One is, okay, document the system. The other one is, is there a way that we can reduce the complexity of the system? Is there a way we could reduce… Is there some components? Like right now, I'm looking at a thing in my own business, where we've expanded. And I think systems in life kind of expands and contracts over time. And we have… If a customer wants to get a different type of espresso machine for our coffee business, "Hey, let's get that one, and let's get that one." And next thing you know, we got 30 different machines available for our customers. And each of those have their own parts that we now have to stock. And now, the complexity explodes. And I had a conversation with my business partner, saying, "Maybe, what we need to do is bring our business back to three main machines," which is where it is anyways. It's just that all the other ones are not bringing as much revenue, but they're bringing massive complexity. So I'm thinking about document the system, and I'm also thinking about trying to reduce that complexity.   0:52:35.4 Sheila Ronis: And that's exactly how you need to do it. But stepping back into the next larger system, to see the whole, is absolutely critical.   0:52:45.2 Andrew Stotz: Yeah.   0:52:46.5 Sheila Ronis: Otherwise, you frequently miss things that you have to see. And there's no substitute for that.   0:52:54.3 Andrew Stotz: Yep. Now, I want to wrap up. And maybe, we can wrap up with one or two of your final memories, and things that you're thinking about Dr. Deming that we can understand more.   0:53:09.5 Sheila Ronis: Oh, wow. I think that… I think, probably, the thing that really… I'll just tell you one story, and maybe another. My late husband was a statistician at the University of Michigan. And Ed Rothman, who was the chairman of the statistics department, used to have a night where it would be called, 'Ask the Statistician.' And he used to ask my husband to join him, because they were really the two preeminent statisticians at the University of Michigan. And one day, I was sitting… I don't remember whether… It was in Michigan. I wasn't in Washington with Dr. Deming. But Dr. Deming came to Michigan a lot. And we were sitting in a conference room somewhere. And I was saying, "Oh, tonight my husband has an event at the University of Michigan, because he and the head of the statistics department do an, 'Ask the Statistician night.'" And Dr. Deming looked at me, and he said, "You know David Ronis? David's your husband?" And I said, "Well, yeah. Of course." And he said, "Oh, my goodness. I never realized." And for many years, he knew my husband, and he knew me. But he'd never put it together that we were married to each other.   0:54:58.1 Sheila Ronis: Anyway. But anyhow, he… And he was a very fine musician. And I always… It was just one other way that he and I were similar, and had a similar passion. When I was young, I studied for six years with Stanley Merritt, of the Cleveland Orchestra. And I thought I would be a concert bassoonist. And then I took my first physics class, and I came home and announced, "I'm not gonna go to Eastman, or anything. I think I wanna be a physicist. I can have music as a hobby the rest of my life. But I gotta be serious about this physics stuff, or it's not gonna work." And when I told Dr. Deming that story, he laughed, and he said, "So what did your mother say?" And I said, "Oh, my mother was heartbroken. But my father said, 'Thank God.'" And Dr. Deming just roared. And he said, "Yes. We both have done very well going into a technical field, didn't we?" And I said, "Yes, sir. I think we did." And he said, "And we've done much more for the world."   0:56:29.2 Andrew Stotz: Yeah. Well…   0:56:32.3 Sheila Ronis: And he really believed he was able, through his work, to improve people's lives. And one of the things he would say to CEOs, as part of their job, was, "Your job is to create jobs. Jobs, jobs, and more jobs. Because with jobs, you're creating a society that is healthy. When a person has a job, they can feed their family. They can have a good life. And you're gonna do that by creating a product or service that somebody wants to buy, and that adds to the society, and the well-being of people." And he really believed that. And I think that he was right. Jobs are what it's all about. And as long as you have a job, and you can pay your bills, and raise your families, and make the world a better place. I mean, that's what life is all about.   0:57:39.3 Andrew Stotz: Yeah. Well, I think I'm gonna end it on that part. And on behalf of everyone at the Deming Institute, I want to thank you, again, for this discussion. And for listeners, remember to go to deming.org, and jump into DemingNext, to continue your journey. Also, if you want to reach out to Sheila, and share something, or ask a question, you can reach her at… I'll read out her email: sheilarr@aol.com. Shoot her an email, and ask a question, or share a story. This is your host, Andrew Stotz. And I'll leave you with one of my favorite quotes, speaking of jobs, and jobs, and more jobs: "People are entitled to joy in work." Thank you, Sheila.   0:58:28.2 Sheila Ronis: Thank you. Take care.